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Note 
 
Ugly on the Inside: An Argument for a Narrow 
Interpretation of Employer Defenses to 
Appearance Discrimination 
Mila Gumin 
In May of 2010, Cassandra Smith was called into the Rose-
ville, Michigan Hooters office for her two year review. Her 
managers praised her “excellence in . . . dealing with customer 
complaints and customer satisfaction.”1 Then, two women from 
company headquarters broke the news: she had thirty days to 
improve her shirt and short size to meet Hooters standards.2 
Devastated and confused, Smith filed suit against Hooters, al-
leging discrimination under the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act 
of Michigan, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
weight.3 Hooters’ response? “[I]t matters what [Hooters girls] 
look like in Michigan.”4  
Why should Hooters be allowed to decide what their em-
ployees should look like in Michigan? Federal and state stat-
utes prevent Hooters from deciding that they prefer all their 
 
  J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A 2006, 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The author thanks Professor Jill 
Hasday for helping work out the idea and her helpful comments. Special 
thanks also goes to Jennifer Gover Bannon and Laura Arneson for their work 
in reviewing, editing, and taking this Note to the next level. Copyright © 2012 
by Mila Gumin. 
 1. Taryn Asher, Hooters Server Cassie Smith Says She’s on Weight Pro-
bation, MYFOXDETROIT (May 18, 2010, 5:37 PM), http://www.myfoxdetroit 
.com/dpp/news/local/hooters-server-says-she’s-on-weight-probation. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Is Cassie Smith’s Hooter’s Uniform Size an Exception to Michigan El-
liot-Larsen Civil Rights Act or Is Cassie Simply Already Fun Size? LEGAL PUB 
(May 25, 2010, 4:29 PM), http://legalpublication.blogspot.com/2010/05/is-cassie 
-smiths-hooters-uniform-size.html [hereinafter Hooters]. 
 4. Michigan Law Opened Door to Hooters Lawsuits, MLIVE.COM (June 6, 
2010, 11:41 PM), http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2010/06/michigan_ 
law_opened_door_to_ho.html. 
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employees to be black or Asian or under the age of forty.5 A 
survey showed that for interviewers, “appearance [is] the single 
most important factor in employee selection for a wide variety 
of jobs.”6 Yet, in the majority of jobs, appearance, just like the 
above mentioned factors, forms no part of the actual job func-
tion. For example, a fireman can climb ladders and hoist people 
out of burning buildings regardless of whether he poses for the 
annual firefighter’s calendar. Only a few cities and states have 
recognized this problem and prohibit discrimination on the ba-
sis of appearance.7  
In its defense, Hooters may assert that attractiveness is an 
absolutely necessary quality for its waitresses and that the res-
taurant should be granted an exception to the Michigan law.8 
Most antidiscrimination statutes include defenses that allow 
employers to assert that in their particular situation the dis-
crimination in question is both necessary and appropriate.9 
Whether “plus-sex” businesses like Hooters should be able to 
assert such a defense remains a controversial question.10 These 
businesses primarily sell food, clothing, or services, but use the 
image of the “sexy” employee to distinguish themselves.11 A 
major outstanding question in the study of appearance discrim-
ination is whether Hooters or any other businesses that uses 
the appearance of employees as a marketing tool should be al-
lowed to assert the defense that an attractive appearance is ab-
solutely necessary for their employees. Should these defenses 
 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1999) (prohibiting discrimination on the ba-
sis of race); 29 U.S.C. § 623 (f )(1) (2002) (prohibiting discrimination against 
anyone on the basis of their age). 
 6. Elizabeth M. Adamitis, Note & Comment, Appearance Matters: A Pro-
posal to Prohibit Appearance Discrimination in Employment, 75 WASH. L. REV. 
195, 195 (2000) (citing Note, Facial Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law 
to Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Physical Appearance, 100 HARV. 
L. REV. 2035, 2040 (1987)).  
 7. See e.g., Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 37.2202 (2011); SANTA CRUZ, CAL., CODE § 9.83 (2011), available at http:// 
www.codepublishing.com/CA/SantaCruz/html/santacruz09/santacruz0983.html; 
D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 (2001). 
 8. See Miller Cohen PLC, Weight Discrimination Case Involving Hooters’ 
Waitresses Allowed, FINDLAW KNOWLEDGE BASE, http://knowledgebase.findlaw 
.com/kb/2010/Oct/173209.html ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012). 
 9. See infra Part I.D. 
 10. Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explain-
ing Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 147, 152 (2004). 
 11. HOOTERS, http://www.hooters.com/About.aspx ( last visited Apr. 16, 
2012). 
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be limited to businesses and occupations whose primary prod-
uct is presenting an image, like exotic dancers or the theater? 
This Note argues that exceptions to appearance discrimi-
nation statutes should be written and construed narrowly to 
limit employer defenses to those businesses that sell looks ex-
clusively. The solution proposed by this Note is unique in its 
narrow focus on the employer defenses within proposed stat-
utes. Although several articles have presented proposals for an-
ti-appearance discrimination laws, none has focused extensive-
ly on the form that employer defenses should take. Part I 
reviews the history of appearance discrimination and its impact 
on employment, and presents the proposals advanced by other 
commentators to battle appearance discrimination. It examines 
the background of employer exceptions and the language and 
interpretation of employer exceptions in current antidiscrimi-
nation statutes. Part II analyzes the existing employer excep-
tions and evaluates the legal and social arguments advanced to 
define the limits of employer exceptions in appearance discrim-
ination statutes. Finally, Part III suggests that to preserve the 
strength and effectiveness of appearance discrimination stat-
utes, exceptions such as Bona Fide Occupational Qualification 
(BFOQ) and business necessity should be written and inter-
preted narrowly to limit their application to businesses that 
primarily sell looks and not other products or services. 
I.  APPEARANCE DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYER 
EXCEPTIONS   
This Part will discuss the problem of appearance discrimi-
nation, outline its historical background, and explain why it is 
a problem in need of a solution. Next, it briefly describes two 
proposals in the academic literature that address the problem 
via proposed statutes. Finally, this Part will explain the mean-
ing and development of employer exceptions in existing antidis-
crimination statutes, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 (Title VII), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and state 
and local statutes currently in force which combat appearance 
discrimination. 
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A. THE ROLE OF APPEARANCE IN EVERYDAY LIFE 
Even before recorded history, human decision making ac-
counted for physical beauty and appearance.12 An attractive 
appearance helped to draw the most successful mates, who 
helped ensure that a person’s genes were passed on to the next 
generation.13 Since all people cannot achieve physical perfec-
tion at all times, even ancient cultures developed methods to 
improve their appearances and thus, their standing in society.14 
Research shows that appearance continues to be a major deci-
sion-making factor in all areas of life today; one study demon-
strated that school teachers, despite professing to love all stu-
dents equally, preferred the attractive children in their 
evaluations.15 Simulated juries deliver smaller damage verdicts 
and stiffer sentences to less attractive plaintiffs.16 Study sub-
jects associate attractive people with positive characteristics 
like “virtue, integrity, intelligence, sensitivity, kindness and 
honesty.”17 Subconscious association of beauty with other posi-
tive traits manifests itself in many decision-making processes.  
Early American city statutes explicitly forbade unattrac-
tive people from partaking in some activities, even leaving their 
homes.18 Although such explicit division no longer exists, deci-
sion making based on appearance in the employment context is 
permissible in all but a small number of states and localities.19 
 
 12. See GORDON L. PATZER, LOOKS: WHY THEY MATTER MORE THAN YOU 
EVER IMAGINED 11–12 (2008) (noting the discovery of necklaces in a 75,000-
year-old archaeological site). 
 13. See id. at 13. Theorists also posit that attractiveness was preferred in 
leaders, who, by virtue of their height or strength, were thought to better pro-
tect the community. See id. at 76. 
 14. Id. at 18–19. Writings from the Greeks, early Hebrews, and Romans 
confirm that attractive people were desired for both marriage and leadership. 
Id. at 11.  
 15. Jordan Bello, Note, Attractiveness as Hiring Criteria: Savvy Business 
Practice or Racial Discrimination?, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 483, 496 (2004). 
 16. DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS 27 (2010). 
 17. Adamitis, supra note 6, at 197. Overweight people, by contrast, are 
associated with “laziness, lack of discipline, incompetence, lack of productivity, 
and slovenliness.” Id.  
 18. RHODE, supra note 16, at 117 n.4 (noting the existence of laws, includ-
ing one in Chicago, which imposed fines on “persons appearing in public who 
were diseased, maimed, mutilated or in any way deformed so as to be an un-
sightly or disgusting object” (citation omitted)). 
 19. William R. Corbett, The Ugly Truth About Appearance Discrimination 
and the Beauty of Our Employment Discrimination Law, 14 DUKE J. GENDER 
L. & POL’Y 153, 164 (2007). 
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A number of physical characteristics combine to form what 
is known as “appearance.”20 These include both mutable and 
immutable features, including height, weight, symmetry of fea-
tures, size of features, style of dress, and grooming.21 Although 
arguments have been made to the contrary, research shows 
that basic appearance preferences have stayed relatively con-
stant over the years22—“[h]uman beings find the greatest beau-
ty in symmetry.”23 
B. APPEARANCE DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
Appearance discrimination in the workplace affects job 
prospects and advancement opportunities. People who fit the 
societal definition of attractiveness are more likely to be hired 
and have a greater probability of retaining the position and ad-
vancing in their careers.24 In a survey of interviewers, appear-
ance emerged as the “single most important factor in employee 
selection for a wide variety of jobs.”25 This remains true even 
when performance of a job has no clear relationship to appear-
ance or attractiveness.26 For example, when asked to hire a 
truck driver, a position clearly unrelated to appearance, study 
subjects consistently selected the “average-looking and attrac-
tive” candidate over unattractive candidates.27 Studies also 
show that attractive individuals earn more money throughout 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. See PATZER, supra note 12, at 3. 
 22. Adamitis, supra note 6, at 196–97. For purposes of studies and exper-
iments, scientists use a “truth in consensus” approach to determining which 
pictures are “attractive,” asking subjects to rank pictures on a scale and aver-
aging their scores. RHODE, supra note 16, at 24. But see Bello, supra note 15, 
at 497 (suggesting that depictions throughout history show changing stand-
ards of beauty). 
 23. Marquardt has formulated a theory that human aesthetic principles 
are based on the “golden ratio,” and also found patterns in paintings and life. 
PATZER, supra note 12, at 15. 
 24. See Bello, supra note 15, at 495–96. Even though most employers be-
lieve they personally do not hire based on personal attractiveness, studies 
show that even long-time managers end up selecting the more attractive ap-
plicant over his less attractive peers. PATZER, supra note 12, at 74. In so doing, 
they may consciously believe they are hiring the better qualified candidate. Id. 
 25. Adamitis, supra note 6. 
 26. See PATZER, supra note 12, at 76–79 (discussing the effect of personal 
appearance on decision making in military hiring). 
 27. PATZER, supra note 12, at 79. Patzer also notes that the same study 
showed limits of attractiveness. Study subjects routinely refused to select an 
attractive woman for a “masculine” job when a less attractive woman was 
available. Id. 
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their lifetimes28 and are treated more leniently by their super-
visors.29 A focus on appearance and disregard for actual qualifi-
cations contributes to inefficiency in the workforce.30 Instead of 
focusing on a person’s intellectual merits and accomplishments, 
employers who hire based on the positive characteristics they 
associate with an attractive appearance are less likely to hire 
the best candidate.31 Furthermore, a focus on appearance can 
lead to stress and illness for less attractive employees who 
struggle to match up.32 
Appearance discrimination in the context of employment is 
defined by the preference for a more attractive candidate or 
employee, regardless of whether appearance actually forms a 
part of the job description. The problem is sometimes also re-
ferred to as “lookism.”33 Although appearance discrimination 
affects employee job prospects at all levels of the employment 
spectrum, very little protection or redress is available for vic-
tims in today’s legal world. 
C. PROPOSALS FOR PROTECTING VICTIMS OF APPEARANCE 
DISCRIMINATION 
Today, discrimination on the basis of appearance is legal 
under federal antidiscrimination law and in most states and lo-
calities.34 Only one state and a few localities protect victims of 
appearance discrimination.35 In recognition of this paucity of 
 
 28. Studies have demonstrated that “[t]all men receive a pay premium, 
while obese women experience a pay penalty.” Id. at 75.  
 29. A study in Illinois found that managers subconsciously considered ap-
pearance and gender in deciding whether to punish a violator of the employee 
policy. Id. at 87. 
 30. It is well established that the most meritorious candidate is one who 
can most efficiently and effectively perform a job. If merit is not the primary 
consideration in hiring, inefficiency must result. Cf. James Desir, Note, 
Lookism: Pushing the Frontier of Equality by Looking Beyond the Law, 2010 
U. ILL. L. REV. 629, 637 (2010) (“Appearance-based discrimination is problem-
atic . . . because it undermines merit-based decision making.”). 
 31. See PATZER, supra note 12, at 74; see also RHODE, supra note 16, at 28. 
 32. This is particularly true for women and can lead to extreme results, 
including eating disorders. See Adamitis, supra note 6, at 215. 
 33. Desir, supra note 30, at 632.  
 34. See Corbett, supra note 19. 
 35. See Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2202 
(2010); SANTA CRUZ, CAL., MUN. CODE § 9.83 (2011), available at http:// 
www.codepublishing.com/CA/SantaCruz/html/santacruz09/santacruz0983.html; 
Human Rights Ordinance, URBANA, ILL. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-37 (2010); 
MADISON, WIS., CODE § 39.03(8) (2010), available at http://www.cityofmadison 
.com/dcr/documents/MGOch39.03.pdf; BINGHAMTON, N.Y., CODE § 45-2 (2008), 
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aid to victims, legal scholars have suggested an expansion of 
the antidiscrimination legal spectrum.36 
To date, scholars have made two proposals to extend a le-
gal remedy to all victims of appearance discrimination. One 
scheme proposes that the states incorporate laws against ap-
pearance discrimination into their individual civil rights stat-
utes.37 Proponents of this approach believe that “inclusion of 
appearance into Title VII [the primary federal antidiscrimina-
tion statute] is unrealistic.”38 These proposals are modeled up-
on appearance discrimination statutes currently in place.39 Dis-
crimination based on “physical characteristics, grooming and 
attire that is associated with some already protected category, 
and grooming and attire that has some other cultural or histor-
ical significance” is prohibited under the state-based scheme.40 
The legal framework currently applied to discrimination claims 
is applied to appearance claims.41 One such model statute in-
cludes both a BFOQ and business necessity defense for  
businesses.42  
Other scholars suggest that victims would be best served 
by a federal law incorporated into Title VII.43 The recommend-
ed statute is structured narrowly and includes only the protec-
tion of immutable characteristics, like height, but not those 
which may be controlled by an individual.44 Commentators ar-
 
available at http://www.cityofbinghamton.com/userfiles/file/City%20Code%20& 
%20Legislation/City%20Charter%20and%20Code/45,%20Human%20Rights% 
20Law.pdf; D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 (2001); HOWARD CNTY., MD., CODE § 12.200 
(1992), available at http://www.co.ho.md.us/displayprimary.aspx?id=1803; S.F., 
CAL., CODE § 12A.1 (2000), available at http://www.alrp.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/318/San-Francisco-Municipal-Code.pdf. A few other states have consid-
ered, but not enacted, such bills. See, e.g., Gary Feldman & Judith Ashton, 
Jumping the Gun on Weight Discrimination, BOS. GLOBE ONLINE, June 2, 
2007, http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/ 
06/02/jumping_the_gun_on_weight_discrimination/. The state of Victoria in 
Australia is the only non-U.S. government to provide remedy for appearance 
discrimination. RHODE, supra note 16, at 134–35.  
 36. See Karen Zakrzewski, Comment, The Prevalence of “Look”ism in Hir-
ing Decisions: How Federal Law Should Be Amended to Prevent Appearance 
Discrimination in the Workplace, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 431, 452 (2005). 
 37. Adamitis, supra note 6, at 196. 
 38. Id. at 219. 
 39. Id. at 218–23. 
 40. Id. at 220. 
 41. Id. at 220–21. 
 42. Id. at 221–22. 
 43. Zakrzewski, supra note 36, at 452. 
 44. Id. at 454. Scholars, lawmakers and jurists disagree about which as-
pects of appearance are actually immutable. See Corbett, supra note 19, at 175 
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gue that this limitation would overcome opposition to appear-
ance discrimination laws by aligning more closely with current-
ly protected characteristics like sex, race, and color.45 A federal 
law is necessary, these proposals argue, because a state-based 
regime would lead to a patchwork of inconsistent laws, leaving 
citizens “unlikely to receive equal protection, if any protection 
at all.”46  
The two proposals discussed above are strong starting 
points for the conversation about anti-appearance discrimina-
tion statutes. The following discussion of employer defenses fo-
cuses on a part of the statutory language that the proposed so-
lutions address only in limited ways. 
D. EXISTING STATUTES AND EMPLOYER EXCEPTIONS 
Most discrimination in employment laws on the federal, 
state, and local level include some limited defenses for employ-
ers. Exceptions were designed to provide employers with pro-
tection in the rare circumstances where the work in question 
could be performed by only one class of worker, forcing the em-
ployer to make discriminatory choices in the hiring process. 
This Section presents the several forms of employer exceptions 
found in the primary federal antidiscrimination statutes and 
the currently existing appearance discrimination statutes on 
the state and local level.  
There is limited information available about the legislative 
history behind the introduction of the BFOQ, the most com-
monly invoked employer exception.47 The Interpretive Memo-
randum of Title VII refers to the BFOQ as a “‘limited exception’ 
to the prohibition against discrimination and explain[s] that 
employers are given a ‘limited right to discriminate . . . where 
the reason for the discrimination is a bona fide occupational 
qualification.’”48 This document provides little detail, but sug-
gests that lawmakers believed that employers should be able to 
discriminate when selectiveness on the basis of the relevant 
 
(noting the “popularly-held understanding” that employment discrimination 
law “forbids consideration of immutable traits” and discussing whether this is 
in fact true). 
 45. Zakrzewski, supra note 36, at 454.  
 46. Id. at 452. 
 47. Katie Manley, Note, The BFOQ Defense: Title VII’s Concession to Gen-
der Discrimination, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 169, 171 (2009). 
 48. Id. at 172 (citation omitted). 
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characteristic was genuinely necessary to their business.49 Af-
ter the enactment of the ADEA, the Secretary of Labor, who is 
responsible for interpreting all of the federal antidiscrimination 
statutes, issued guidelines for the implementation of its em-
ployer exceptions.50 “These guidelines provided that to be a 
[reasonable factor other than age], a criterion must be ‘reason-
ably necessary for the specific work to be performed’ or ‘have 
shown a valid relationship to job requirements.’”51 Courts have 
struggled to identify appropriate limits for these exceptions.52 
1. Employer Defenses in the Major Federal Antidiscrimination 
Statutes 
Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, reli-
gion, color, national origin, or sex.53 These categories are treat-
ed differently for purposes of employer exceptions. Race and 
color are not subject to employer exceptions.54 For example, if a 
theater company produced a play about Malcolm X, a white 
man rejected for the role could initiate a claim of discrimination 
against the company, alleging that he was not selected for the 
part on account of his race. If he can meet his burden of proof55 
and show that his race was the true reason for his rejection or 
that without a consideration of race, he would not have been re-
 
 49. Some of the examples provided included the “preference of a French 
restaurant for a French cook, the preference of a professional baseball team of 
male players.” Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Judith J. Johnson, Reasonable Factors Other Than Age: The 
Emerging Specter of Ageist Stereotypes, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 49, 68 (2009) 
(noting the extensive involvement of the Secretary in the creation of the stat-
utes and suggesting that his statements accurately reflected the legislative 
intent behind the employer exceptions) (citation omitted). 
 52. A number of articles have chronicled the confused history of business-
exception interpretation. See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, BFOQ Revisited: John-
son Controls Halts the Expansion of the Defense to Intentional Sex Discrimina-
tion, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 5 passim (1991); Michael J. Frank, Justifiable Discrimi-
nation in the News and Entertainment Industries: Does Title VII Need a Race 
or Color BFOQ?, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 473 passim (2001); Yuracko, supra note 10 
passim. 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1999). 
 54. Id. § 2000e-2(e) (providing a defense for some employers as to discrim-
ination on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin, excluding race and color). 
 55. Title VII cases that do not involve mixed motives are evaluated using 
the McConnell Douglas test, a burden-shifting analysis that derives from 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800–07 (1973). For more in-
formation, see Tristin K. Green, Making Sense of the McDonnell Douglas 
Framework: Circumstantial Evidence and Proof of Disparate Treatment Under 
Title VII, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 983 (1999).  
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jected,56 the theater company has no defense. They will be 
found in violation of Title VII. However, the drafters of Title 
VII included defenses for employers when the discrimination 
involves sex, religion, or national origin.57 If a woman proved 
that she was rejected for the Malcolm X role on account of her 
sex, the theater company could successfully assert that being 
male was a bona fide occupational qualification of playing an 
authentic Malcolm X.58 The Title VII language thus includes 
two different approaches to employer exceptions. 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) pro-
hibits discrimination against anyone forty years of age or older 
on the basis of their age.59 Employer exceptions included in the 
ADEA are similar to those in Title VII.60 The language of the 
statute permits an employer to assert a BFOQ and to discrimi-
nate when following an already established and enforced sen-
iority system.61 However, the ADEA permits employers one ad-
ditional defense. An adverse discriminatory action by an 
employer is defensible under the ADEA if the employer can 
demonstrate62 that the action was based on “reasonable factors 
other than age” (RFOA).63 Courts have found this term to be 
vague. Some have interpreted it broadly, to allow employers a 
wide range of “reasonable” factors, even those closely tied to 
 
 56. If race was one of several factors in his rejection, the theater company 
would have to prove that without consideration of his race, it would still have 
made the same employment decision. This is part of a framework derived for 
“mixed motive” cases in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240–47 
(1989). 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). 
 58. In its regulations, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) gave the example of authenticity in an actor as a situation where a 
BFOQ ought to be recognized. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (1986). 
 59. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631(a) (2002). 
 60. Id. § 623(f )(1). 
 61. Id. 
 62. The McDonnell Douglas framework is also applied in ADEA cases. 
George O. Luce, Why Disparate Impact Claims Should Not Be Allowed Under 
the Federal Employer Provisions of the ADEA, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 439 
(2004). The reasonable-factor analysis is available as a defense to employers 
who are found to have discriminated. Id. 
 63. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f )(1). 
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age.64 Others have pursued a more limited view that analyzes 
the reasonableness of other factors critically.65  
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was enacted in 
1990 and protects employees who have, or are perceived to 
have, a “physical or mental impairment that substantially lim-
its one or more of the major life activities.”66 The structure of 
the ADA is dissimilar from either the ADEA or Title VII. In or-
der to bring a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must first prove 
that he falls within one of the three categories the Act identi-
fies.67 This requirement serves as a gatekeeper for the ADA 
and grants the employer an additional step at which they may 
prove that the claimant lacks a case. Once an employee has 
demonstrated that they are qualified to pursue a case under 
the ADA, the employer can defend himself only by showing that 
there was no reasonable accommodation that could have been 
implemented to avoid the adverse employment action.68 The 
federal laws provided a model for current state and local laws 
on appearance discrimination, but the states and localities also 
diverged in their approaches. 
2. Employer Exceptions in the Existing State and Local 
Appearance Discrimination Statutes 
The few states and localities which have enacted appear-
ance discrimination statutes each take a different view of em-
ployer defenses. Michigan, whose civil rights statute prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of height and weight, closely follows 
Title VII in its exceptions.69 It provides employers with a BFOQ 
 
 64. This result was achieved by assigning the burden of proof to refute the 
asserted reason to the plaintiff, rather than the defendant. See Meacham v. 
Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 90 (2008). 
 65. These courts argue that many “reasonable factors,” ostensibly unre-
lated to age, like seniority and higher salaries, are so correlated to age that 
making business decisions on the basis of these factors amounts to age dis-
crimination. See Johnson, supra note 51, 67 n.154 (2009). The Supreme Court 
assigned the burden of proof to the defendant in Meacham v. Knolls Atomic 
Power Laboratory but it remains unclear whether it endorsed a restrictive 
view of reasonable factors other than age. Id. at 60, 65. 
 66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102, 12112 (2006). 
 67. In order to qualify for protection, a plaintiff must demonstrate either 
that they have a disability or that the adverse action in question was motivat-
ed by a belief that they have a disability. See Jane Byeff Korn, Fat, 77 B.U. L. 
REV. 25, 41–42 (1997). 
 68. Id. 
 69. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2208 (2011). 
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defense.70 Few cases have arisen applying the exceptions, and 
it remains unclear whether Michigan has a pattern of narrow 
or broad application.71 The Human Rights Act in Washington, 
D.C. includes the most expansive protection for victims of ap-
pearance discrimination.72 The statute prohibits all discrimina-
tion on the basis of “personal appearance.”73 The statute in-
cludes a business necessity defense, which is not available 
unless “it can be proved . . . that, without such exception, such 
business cannot be conducted.”74 However, the drafters saw fit 
to include an additional defense for businesses specific to ap-
pearance discrimination.75 Employers may assert that their act 
of discrimination is part of a “prescribed standard” with a “rea-
sonable business purpose.”76  
Appearance discrimination is a problem in employment, 
and scholars have advanced several solutions to address it. A 
key portion of the proposed statutes must be the extent to 
which employers may obtain exceptions. The next Part analyzes 
the positives and negatives of these approaches and advocates 
for the best approach to incorporate into new laws when state 
legislators tackle the problem of appearance discrimination. 
II.  ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT APPROACHES TO 
EMPLOYER EXCEPTIONS   
This Part will analyze the approaches used by courts in in-
terpreting employer defenses in antidiscrimination statutes 
currently in effect. It presents the positive outcomes of narrow 
approaches and the problems created for victims of discrimina-
tion by court permissiveness in the interpretation of employer 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. See, e.g., Micu v. City of Warren, 382 N.W. 2d 823, 584–86 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1985) (finding that the fire department could not discriminate on a basis 
of height unless height was established to be a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation and that remand was necessary for hearing on the issue). 
 72. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402.11 (2010) (“It shall be an unlawful discrimi-
natory practice to do any of the following acts, wholly or partially for a dis-
criminatory reason based upon the actual or perceived . . . personal appear-
ance . . . of any individual.”). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. § 2-1401.3(a) (“Any practice . . . which would otherwise be prohibit-
ed by this chapter shall not be deemed unlawful if it can be . . . justified by 
business necessity.”). 
 75. Id. § 2-1401.02(22) (“‘Personal appearance’ . . . shall not relate, howev-
er, to the requirement of . . . prescribed standards, when uniformly  
applied . . . .”). 
 76. Id. 
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defenses. Next, it identifies the arguments made by other 
scholars in support of narrow and broad interpretations and 
shows how these arguments reflect attitudes about appearance 
discrimination. 
A. ANALYSIS OF THE DEFENSES IN FEDERAL STATUTES 
By virtue of its broad reach, Title VII includes several dif-
ferent approaches to business exceptions. The most commonly 
litigated defense is the BFOQ exception for sex discrimina-
tion.77 Courts usually interpret this exception narrowly, reject-
ing, for example, defenses based on customer preference.78 One 
of the most well-known gender discrimination cases, Wilson v. 
Southwest Airlines, involved Southwest’s attempt to assert a 
BFOQ defense to Title VII claims that it discriminated against 
men in its hiring of flight attendants.79 In the early 1970s, 
Southwest, striving to set itself apart from other commuter air-
lines, implemented a marketing campaign centered on the con-
cept of “love.”80 The marketing and brand image promoted 
“love” in the form of female sexuality.81 Therefore, Southwest 
asserted that the female flight attendant was essential to their 
business.82 The District Court robustly rejected Southwest’s ar-
guments.83 The court found that the essence of Southwest’s 
business was carrying passengers, not promoting female sexu-
ality, and denied them an exception.84 The court determined 
that the BFOQ exception was designed to apply only when the 
characteristic in question went to the heart of the business.85 
This narrow approach prevents businesses from eluding the an-
tidiscrimination laws by simply claiming that their businesses 
would suffer economically if they did not exactly meet customer 
preferences.86 As the Southwest opinion noted, allowing the op-
posite result would have permitted employers to perpetuate the 
 
 77. See Manley, supra note 47, at 170. 
 78. Befort, supra note 52, at 12. 
 79. Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292, 293 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
 80. Id. at 294–96. 
 81. Id. at 295. 
 82. Id. at 293. 
 83. Id. at 302. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 301. 
 86. See Manley, supra note 47, at 183 (arguing that the EEOC guidelines 
stating that “the refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of 
coworkers, the employer, client or customers” does not permit a BFOQ  
exception). 
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very stereotypes that Title VII was enacted to overcome and 
“swallow the rule.”87  
However, courts have permitted businesses greater lati-
tude when the customer interest in question is safety.88 Some 
writers argue that this is simply another, impermissible exten-
sion of stereotyping behaviors,89 while others suggest that the 
customer preferences at the heart of safety claims are funda-
mentally different.90 Safety concerns may arise in the context of 
appearance discrimination. 
As discussed previously, Title VII also includes provisions 
to combat race and color discrimination, but permits no defens-
es for a business accused of violations.91 Commentators have 
argued that this is due to the fact that Title VII was primarily 
enacted to combat racial discrimination, and the other classifi-
cations were added in the drafting process.92 The three differ-
ent approaches outlined above highlight the range of views on 
interpretation that may be derived from Title VII. 
The language of the ADEA is more permissive towards 
employers than Title VII. In addition to permitting an employer 
to assert that age is a BFOQ for the position in question, em-
ployers may also assert that another “reasonable factor[] other 
than age” (RFOA) was responsible for their employment deci-
sion.93 It remains unclear whether employers should be able to 
argue that age-correlated reasons, like higher salary or pension 
benefits, were the “reasonable factors” that actually led to the 
 
 87. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 304. 
 88. Befort, supra note 52, at 19–20. 
 89. See Manley, supra note 47, at 186–88, 190–91 (reviewing courts’ rejec-
tion of customer preference BFOQ arguments and noting the inconsistency of 
permitting customer preferences for privacy to constitute a BFOQ). 
 90. See Yuracko, supra note 10, at 191 (arguing that the “customer-
focused perfectionism” approach shows that privacy can be distinguished 
based on its centrality to the human self-image). 
 91. Frank, supra note 52, at 473–74. 
 92. See Corbett, supra note 19, at 172 (finding that the history of racial 
discrimination is much more prominent and socially understood than other 
forms of discrimination). Some critics argue that entirely eliminating employer 
defenses leaves employers without a way to defend themselves in situations 
where race or color legitimately relates to the job. See Frank, supra note 52, at 
498–501 (evaluating the reasons why some believe that a race and color BFOQ 
should be judicially or legislatively established). But see id. at 506–25 (analyz-
ing the evidence and concluding that race and color discrimination in the en-
tertainment industry does not justify the creation of a BFOQ for race and color). 
 93. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f )(1) (2002). 
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decision.94 The history of the RFOA demonstrates that the in-
troduction of more employer defenses serves to create addition-
al confusion. Defenses may be used by employers to provide 
themselves with cover when making decisions that are so close-
ly correlated with age that they are guaranteed to have an ad-
verse affect on people over the age of forty.95 A similarly per-
missive defense in the appearance context would, for example, 
protect an employer who fired all employees who no longer fit 
the available size two uniforms. This “reasonable factor” is so 
closely correlated with weight that to permit it would destroy 
the purpose of an appearance discrimination statute. This 
analysis suggests that only the narrowest employer exceptions 
can be implemented while still protecting the essence of anti-
discrimination statutes.  
B. EMPLOYER DEFENSES IN THE STATE AND LOCAL 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION STATUTES 
Michigan, the only state to include height and weight dis-
crimination within its civil rights law, provides employers with 
a BFOQ defense.96 The case of Micu v. City of Warren is, thus 
far, the sole case to test the BFOQ against height discrimina-
tion.97 An applicant for a firefighting position was rejected be-
cause he did not meet the five-foot-eight inch height require-
ment after passing all other relevant physical tests.98 The court 
applied the BFOQ exception narrowly, scrutinized the evidence 
presented by the department and remanded the case, finding 
that the department had failed to establish that height was 
“reasonably necessary to the normal operation of [its] busi-
ness.”99 The court approached the exception narrowly by criti-
cally examining the employer’s assertions and not permitting 
common assumptions about height to influence their analy-
sis.100 The court did not allow the department to simply rest on 
unsubstantiated statements that the height restriction was 
“reasonable” and based on unspecified “safety concerns.”101 
 
 94. See Johnson, supra note 51, at 49–50 (noting that despite recent Su-
preme Court decisions, it is still unclear whether age-correlated reasons may 
be “reasonable factors other than age”). 
 95. Id. 
 96. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2208 (2011). 
 97. Micu v. City of Warren, 382 N.W.2d 823, 827 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985). 
 98. Id. at 824. 
 99. Id. at 827–28. 
 100. Id. at 828. 
 101. Id. at 827. 
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Such a narrow approach is preferable because it limits BFOQ 
exception to instances where the employer can prove, by sub-
stantial evidence, that only by discriminating can it continue to 
run its business. This heavy burden protects the statute from 
internal attack on the basis of stereotypes, which are often used 
to support BFOQ claims.102 
The D.C. Human Rights Law incorporates a business-
necessity defense.103 The statute specifically enumerates a 
number of typical employer claims which it judges to be im-
permissible bases for a business-necessity defense.104 This lan-
guage suggests that the statute should be interpreted narrowly. 
Washington, D.C., however, undercut this tough provision spe-
cifically with regard to appearance discrimination. The “pre-
scribed standard” with a “reasonable business purpose” test105 
is much weaker than the business necessity standard.106 In one 
case, the D.C. Court of Appeals approved an employer policy 
forbidding males to wear ponytails as a reasonable interpreta-
tion of a written requirement for a neat hairstyle.107 This hold-
ing demonstrates the D.C. courts’ willingness to accept employ-
er standards based on gendered stereotypes, including the 
presumption that long hair on a male is not neat and does not 
promote cleanliness.108 This approach gives employers too great 
an opportunity to avoid the boundaries set by the antidiscrimi-
nation statute. It appears that as long as the standard is clear-
ly written and uniformly enforced, the D.C. courts are unwill-
ing to question whether the motivation behind the standard 
 
 102. One dominant interpretation of antidiscrimination law argues that its 
purpose is to protect employees from discrimination based on “stereotyped im-
pressions.” Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Anti-
discrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 10 (2000). Businesses often seek a 
BFOQ based on a stereotyped presumption that a particular class would not 
be able to perform the job. See Manley, supra note 47, at 172 (discussing the 
EEOC guidelines as to the sex BFOQ, explaining that “stereotyped characteri-
zations” are not an acceptable basis for refusal to hire). 
 103. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1401.03(a) (2010) (“Any practice . . . which would 
otherwise be prohibited by this chapter shall not be deemed unlawful if it can 
be . . . justified by business necessity.”). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 106. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 107. Zakrzewski, supra note 36, at 449. 
 108. Gendered grooming standards often require men to wear their hair 
short to promote “neatness.” Certainly, a man is as capable of styling his long 
hair in a “neat” manner as is a woman. Michael Starr & Amy L. Strauss, Sex 
Stereotyping in Employment: Can the Center Hold?, 21 LAB. LAW. 213, 240–41 
(2006). 
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violates the spirit of the law against personal appearance dis-
crimination. This approach undermines successful protection of 
victims. 
C. ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING AND REJECTING 
EMPLOYER EXCEPTIONS 
Analysts have suggested a number of arguments to support 
a narrow interpretation of employer defenses. These arguments 
should influence lawmakers as they consider whether to im-
plement appearance discrimination statutes and as they debate 
the role of employer exceptions in those statutes. The case of 
Cassandra Smith may seem innocuous and amusing,109 but it 
could ultimately set a dangerous precedent. Most people are 
not concerned when a restaurant requires its servers to main-
tain a particular appearance.110 This belief may be attributable 
to the perception that waiting tables is not a highly skilled pro-
fession.111 That mindset leads many to look leniently upon res-
taurants that argue that the essence of their business is service 
provided by attractive women and that they should be able to 
assert a BFOQ defense to charges of discrimination on the ba-
sis of appearance.112 This view is problematic on two levels. 
First, this approach undervalues the genuine skills involved in 
effectively serving patrons. These skills may include a friendly 
attitude, the ability to mediate disputes, provide intelligent 
commentary on the merits and content of food, and to serve 
food in a prompt and efficient manner. A lack of distinction be-
tween jobs whose essence is the provision of a look to custom-
ers, such as models or exotic dancers, and jobs where workers 
perform other valuable skills leads to an excessive focus on ap-
pearance to the detriment of other important qualities.113 Thus, 
 
 109. Many articles covering Smith’s complaints take a humorous approach 
to her problem. See, e.g., Hooters, supra note 3.  
 110. See Ann C. McGinley, Babes and Beefcake: Exclusive Hiring Arrange-
ments and Sexy Dress Codes, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 257, 262 (2007). 
 111. See Charlotte Hilton Andersen, Can the Hooters Girl Fired for Weight 
Gain Complain?, HUFFINGTON POST (May 20, 2010, 6:15 PM), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/charlotte-hilton-andersen/can-the-hooters-girl-fire_b_582824 
.html (dismissing Cassandra Smith’s complaints by saying “they weren’t pay-
ing her for her stellar mastery of the menu nor her uncanny ability to remem-
ber all her customer’s names”). 
 112. See, e.g., Judge: Hooters May Have to Hire Overweight Women, 
PATTERICO’S PONTIFICATIONS (Aug. 25, 2010, 4:25 PM), http://patterico.com/ 
2010/08/25/judge-hooters-may-have-to-hire-overweight-women/. 
 113. See Zakrzewski, supra note 36, at 434 (noting that one problem with 
allowing employers to hire individuals based on looks is that people will not 
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if restaurants are permitted to create a looks-focused atmos-
phere by considering attractiveness in hiring, the result may be 
a workforce that is not as accomplished and efficient.114 This 
result is a problem for a business culture like that of the United 
States, where businesses compete on the basis of efficiency and 
productivity.115  
Second, allowing employers a defense against charges of 
discrimination in professions perceived as “low-skill” sets a 
precedent that may easily be applied to “high-skill” jobs.116 
Such a pattern would essentially allow businesses to avoid an-
tidiscrimination laws by changing the definition of their busi-
nesses.117 It is not unprecedented for an employer to assert that 
maleness was a BFOQ of the international executive position 
because Latin American male customers preferred to deal with 
a male executive.118 Since evidence has shown that customers 
respond to attractive people in all levels of employment,119 a 
law firm could presumably claim that its lawyers were engaged 
 
compete for jobs based on substantive factors, but rather on how attractive 
they are). 
 114. A focus on appearance interferes with an employer’s focus on merit-
based characteristics. Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1038 (2009) (discussing studies that show how appear-
ance skews assessments of competence and job performance). A sexualized 
atmosphere where attractiveness is made a priority may actually negatively 
impact female intellectual ability. Yuracko, supra note 10, at 209 (describing 
an experiment where males and females took a math test while trying on a 
swimsuit). 
 115. Alan J. Meese, Monopolization, Exclusion and the Theory of the Firm, 
89 MINN. L. REV. 743, 843 (2005) (noting that businesses “can exclude rivals 
on the basis of efficiency”). 
 116. Stereotypes about weight even prompted concerns about the health of 
Supreme Court nominee Sonia Sotomayor. See RHODE, supra note 16, at 94. 
 117. Kimberly Yuracko argues that permitting businesses to redefine the 
“essence” of their business would result in businesses avoiding discrimination 
charges by claiming that they are not, for example, restaurants, but 
“sextaurants,” for whom attractive female “sextresses” are essential. Yuracko, 
supra note 10, at 173. 
 118. Delia Fernandez brought suit against her former employer, Wynn Oil 
Company, alleging that she was rejected for an executive position because in-
ternational clients preferred to deal with men. Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 20 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1162, 1162 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff ’d, 653 F.2d 1273 
(9th Cir. 1981). The lower court permitted a BFOQ defense, accepting that “no 
customer will do business with” a female in Fernandez’s desired position. 20 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1165. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision on 
other grounds, but rejected the BFOQ claim. Fernandez, 653 F.2d at 1276–77. 
 119. See, e.g., PATZER, supra note 12, at 82–84 (discussing an experiment at 
a Dutch advertising agency which concluded that those managers rated as 
more attractive did, in fact, attract more sales). 
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in the business of providing legal services via an attractive de-
livery vehicle and thereby assert that attractiveness was a 
BFOQ for the position. This slippery slope argument suggests 
that allowing customer preferences to establish an employer 
defense in one industry devalues the contributions of its em-
ployees and opens up all other industries to the claim that cus-
tomer preferences are the essence of the business, defeating the 
purpose of the antidiscrimination laws. 
The slippery slope argument applies in another way to ap-
pearance discrimination. Some scholars have suggested that 
permitting employers to escape sanctions for their appearance-
based hiring, firing, and promotion decisions makes them more 
likely to discriminate on other more traditional grounds like 
race and sex.120 Facially neutral appearance standards, such as 
those that might be permissible under the D.C. statute, may 
conceal illegitimate discriminatory intent related to classes 
that are currently recognized and protected from discrimina-
tion.121 This problem is particularly troubling with regard to 
the evolving field of sexual orientation discrimination.122 Typi-
cally, appearance standards reinforce traditional male and fe-
male gender roles.123 Allowing employers to assert that such 
standards are justifications for an exception to antidiscrimina-
tion statutes leads not only to appearance discrimination, but 
also to hidden discrimination against more traditional protect-
ed classes. 
 
 120. See Hannah Fleener, Note, Looks Sell, but Are They Worth the Cost?: 
How Tolerating Looks-Based Discrimination Leads to Intolerable Discrimina-
tion, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1295, 1305–06 (2005). 
 121. The current prevailing standard of beauty is an Anglo-European look. 
RHODE, supra note 16, at 43. As a result, minorities are disadvantaged be-
cause, by nature, they are less likely to conform to this Anglo-European 
standard. Minorities are also more likely to be impacted with undesirable 
qualities like obesity. Id. 
 122. Sexual orientation itself is an emerging field of antidiscrimination 
law, though in some ways it is more advanced than appearance discrimina-
tion. See generally Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Antidiscrimi-
nation Law After Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1533 
(2001) (highlighting the challenge of finding the “appropriate constitutional 
boundary between protected association and permissible antidiscrimination 
law”).  
 123. For example, men are often prohibited from wearing long hair or po-
nytails in the interest of “neatness.” See, e.g., Kennedy v. District of Columbia, 
654 A.2d 847, 857–58 (D.C. 1994). Similarly, women are often required to wear 
makeup. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1107 
(9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
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Nevertheless, some commentators argue that wide latitude 
for businesses is necessary to preserve an employer’s right to 
determine its business model.124 They point to traditional 
American respect for the market economy and its promotion of 
the autonomy of businesses.125 Businesses, they argue, should 
be able to direct their own image by hiring employees that 
promote it via their appearance.126 The solutions proposed by 
these theorists would allow employers to argue that customer 
preference for attractiveness is so pervasive that without the 
ability to discriminate against unattractive people, they would 
be unable to function.127 Customer preference has been rejected 
as a basis for employer exception by courts and the EEOC be-
cause it would allow employers to perpetuate the very divisions 
and stereotypes which antidiscrimination statutes were enact-
ed to combat.128 Provisions granting wide latitude to employers 
based upon this argument would essentially destroy statutes 
that attempt to prohibit appearance discrimination because 
customers who are accustomed to a particular method of opera-
tion often demand discrimination.129 Part of the purpose of an-
tidiscrimination statutes is to move society in a more equal di-
rection130 and allowing exceptions every time such change 
makes customers uncomfortable would undermine this purpose. 
Other commentators believe that appearance discrimina-
tion is fundamentally different from discrimination against the 
traditionally protected classes, and thus, should be approached 
with greater leniency.131 They assert that appearance discrimi-
nation is simply not as significant of a problem because it is so 
 
 124. See Heather R. James, Note, If You Are Attractive and You Know It, 
Please Apply: Appearance Based Discrimination and Employers Discretion, 42 
VAL. U. L. REV. 629, 662 (2008). 
 125. See Corbett, supra note 19, at 166. 
 126. See James, supra note 124, at 670. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 304 (N.D. Tex. 
1981) (“[T]he BFOQ exception should not be permitted to ‘swallow the rule.’” 
(quoting Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, 
J., concurring))); Befort, supra note 52, at 11 (noting Judge Posner’s statement 
that anything but a “narrow reading” of the BFOQ exception would “gut the 
statute” (citing UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 903 (7th Cir. 
1989) (Posner, J., dissenting))). 
 129. See Zakrzewski, supra note 36, at 438–39. 
 130. See Post, supra note 102, at 4.  
 131. RHODE, supra note 16, at 102 (suggesting that appearance discrimina-
tion is rarely as severe as racism); Rhode, supra note 114, at 1068 (referencing 
Mario Cuomo’s observation that a New York law on appearance discrimination 
was one law too many). 
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common and natural.132 Such an argument devalues the diffi-
culties experienced by individuals discriminated against on the 
basis of appearance.133 It suggests that the harm suffered by 
victims of appearance discrimination is less of a problem than 
traditional discrimination.134 These contentions take advantage 
of the lack of awareness about appearance discrimination.  
A similar class of arguments assert that appearance dis-
crimination is so trivial and pervasive that it is nearly impossi-
ble to eradicate.135 Therefore, these commentators contend that 
if government even attempts to write anti-appearance discrim-
ination statutes, it should write them permissively to reflect 
the fact that employers naturally discriminate based on looks 
and will not soon change their natural proclivities.136 Deborah 
Rhode, a leading scholar on the intersection between appear-
ance and the law, argues that similar contentions were pre-
sented against most antidiscrimination measures currently in 
place.137 Changes in social attitudes following the enactment of 
those rules suggest that the law has led the way to more equi-
table social attitudes.138 In particular, Rhode likens appearance 
discrimination to sexual harassment.139 A similar focus on the 
unusual frivolous case and the presumed triviality of concerns 
attended the inclusion of sexual harassment as a form of sex 
discrimination.140 
The next Part proposes that the solution that best balances 
these concerns is the enactment of appearance discrimination 
laws in each state that permit only employers in businesses 
 
 132. See Rhode, supra note 114, at 1060 (describing dismissive attitudes 
towards the existence of appearance discrimination). 
 133. See id. (noting the way in which society underestimates the social, 
mental, and physical costs of appearance discrimination). 
 134. Evidence shows that appearance discrimination is pervasive, common, 
and destructive to careers. See supra Part I.B. 
 135. See Rhode, supra note 114, at 1067. 
 136. See id. at 1069 (discussing critics’ assertions that appearance discrim-
ination is ineradicable and comparing these criticisms to those leveled at es-
tablished legislation).  
 137. The desire for a distinction between the races was similarly termed a 
“natural desire” and led to the argument that you “can’t legislate morality.” 
See RHODE, supra note 16, at 112. 
 138. See id. (“Legislation such as the American [sic] with Disabilities Act 
also has had powerful positive effects on attitudes about the capacities of disa-
bled individuals.”). 
 139. See id. at 114. 
 140. See id. (“[T]he civil rights law was not meant to be a . . . remedy for 
the ‘petty slights suffered by the hypersensitive.’” (quoting Zabkowicz v. W. 
Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis. 1984))). 
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that sell looks exclusively to assert a defense to appearance dis-
crimination. 
III.  FUTURE LAWMAKERS MUST WRITE AND 
INTERPRET EMPLOYER DEFENSES NARROWLY   
Serious concerns exist about the balance between the 
rights of employees and the rights of the employer.141 The pur-
pose of antidiscrimination law is two-fold. It seeks to protect 
employees from discriminatory behavior but it also seeks to 
change societal perceptions so that, ultimately, the law be-
comes unnecessary and obsolete.142  
Each individual state should take action to prevent ap-
pearance discrimination by introducing statutory protections 
for discrimination victims. Pioneering states and cities have 
proven that appearance discrimination statutes are not exces-
sively burdensome on administrative bodies and the courts.143 
Legislators and adjudicators must avoid the temptation to 
weaken such statutes by giving wide latitude to employers who 
demand exceptions for their businesses. When an anti-
appearance discrimination statute is written, the language 
should make clear that the only businesses which deserve ex-
ceptions are those which sell looks exclusively. Arguments that 
business could not survive such imposition have attended the 
introduction of nearly every antidiscrimination statute, and 
should not be given more credence in the area of appearance 
discrimination.144 This Note’s proposal builds on existing stat-
utes and proposed solutions by focusing specifically on the leg-
islative language and interpretation of employer defenses.  
A. THE RECOMMENDATION 
As legislators consider new statutes, states should follow 
the Title VII sex discrimination model in establishing employer 
exceptions. Appearance discrimination is still a relatively new 
field of study and legislative focus. It would be excessive for leg-
islators to entirely exclude employer exceptions like Title VII 
 
 141. See, e.g., McGinley, supra note 110, at 275. 
 142. See Post, supra note 102, at 8 (“Antidiscrimination law seeks to neu-
tralize widespread forms of prejudice that pervasively disadvantage persons 
based upon inaccurate judgments about their worth or capacities.”). 
 143. None of the jurisdictions where appearance discrimination is currently 
prohibited have been flooded with cases, and most cases that have appeared 
have been settled out of court. See RHODE, supra note 16, at 125–34. 
 144. See, e.g., id. at 106–07. 
 2012] APPEARANCE DISCRIMINATION 1791 
 
does for race and color discrimination.145 Appearance discrimi-
nation is more akin to sex discrimination.146 Therefore, politi-
cians must ensure that genuine instances of legitimate distinc-
tion on the basis of appearance are protected. 
B. WHAT MUST BE THE DEFINITION OF A GENUINE LOOKS-
BASED BUSINESS? 
A key factor in this Note’s proposed solution is the identifi-
cation of appropriate examples of exceptions. Examples may in-
clude exotic dancers, whose sole aim is to provide sexual titilla-
tion to their customers.147 These are men or women who 
perform no meaningful function other than performance and 
the display of their bodies. It is important to distinguish them 
from servers at Hooters or similar establishments, who portray 
themselves primarily as restaurants.148 Another possible excep-
tion should be actors, the essence of whose business is appear-
ing to be a certain character, with his or her own distinctive 
look.149 Courts should not extend the defense to businesses that 
refuse to hire a fitness instructor because she is physically 
large.150 The primary purpose of the fitness instructor is to in-
struct students on fitness moves and routines and ensure the 
health of all students,151 not to provide a “gaze object”152 for 
 
 145. Racial discrimination enjoys a strong consensus as to its existence and 
moral reprehensibility. See Frank, supra note 52, at 496–97 (reviewing the 
numerous arguments that courts have made to suggest that Congress inten-
tionally excluded race and color from the BFOQ defense). 
 146. In fact, the House Representative who sponsored the addition of sex 
discrimination to the bill may have intended for this provision to undermine 
support for the bill and prevent it from passing. Manley, supra note 47. 
 147. Yuracko defines such professions as ones where the “good for sale 
is . . . the use of another person as a sexual gaze object.” Yuracko, supra note 
10, at 157. 
 148. Compare About Hooters, HOOTERS, http://www.hooters.com/About.aspx 
( last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (portraying the restaurant as a “neighborhood 
place”), with Entertainers, ADMIRAL THEATRE, http://www.admiralx.com/at_ 
entertainers.htm ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (describing the employees as 
“showgirl entertainers”). 
 149. The EEOC currently provides actors or actresses as an example of 
permissible discrimination under the sex BFOQ. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) 
(2011). 
 150. Jennifer Portnick, a 240-pound fitness instructor, was denied a fran-
chise with Jazzercise in San Francisco. RHODE, supra note 16, at 18. She later 
went on to successfully teach elsewhere. Id. at 105. 
 151. See, e.g., Gail Sessoms, YMCA Fitness Instructor Certification, 
LIVESTRONG.COM (Mar. 28, 2011), www.livestrong.com/article/405844-ymca 
-fitness-instructor-certification/ (describing the requirements for a fitness in-
structor position). 
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students. Similarly, retailers who only allow certain “attrac-
tive” individuals to work in positions on the selling floor153 
should not receive an exception, as retail floor staff are primari-
ly expected to provide customer service, ring up sales and keep 
the store displays neat and organized.154 
C. WHAT SHOULD LEGISLATORS NOT DO? 
Legislators should not adopt the approach taken by the 
District of Columbia, which permits employers to nearly bypass 
the statute by arguing that their discriminatory action was 
taken as part of “prescribed standards . . . for a reasonable 
business purpose.”155 This language destroys appearance dis-
crimination statutes by explicitly permitting businesses to set 
arbitrary and barely substantiated standards for any profes-
sion. The insertion of such language suggests to courts that leg-
islators intended the exception to be read broadly and leads 
judges to demand less of businesses seeking the exception.  
D. WHICH APPROACH WORKS BEST?  
Instead, legislators should take the approach established 
in the sex discrimination jurisprudence and adopted by Michi-
gan’s civil rights law. Statutes should include a BFOQ excep-
tion, and courts should recognize a business-necessity excep-
tion. These should be interpreted narrowly. In the context of 
appearance discrimination, narrow interpretation will mean 
limiting BFOQs to professions where a person’s appearance is 
the sole or preeminent qualification for the business. Such a 
distinction will preserve the impact of antidiscrimination stat-
utes without undermining the integrity of businesses that sell 
looks. The business necessity defense should be limited in ap-
plication to the very few cases where a different appearance 
might actually interfere with the execution of the job. A legiti-
mate example might be a regulation that prohibits facial hair 
on firefighters because it interferes with the fit of their protec-
 
 152. See Yuracko, supra note 10, at 173. 
 153. American Apparel received a great deal of attention in the summer of 
2010 when internal documents confirmed that store managers were required 
to send full body pictures of potential hires to headquarters. Hamilton Nolan, 
American Apparel: Internal Documents Reveal Uglies Not Welcome, GAWKER 
(June 10, 2010, 3:08 PM), http://gawker.com/5560215/american-apparels-new 
-standard-no-uglies-allowed. 
 154. See, e.g., REI Retail Jobs, REI, www.rei.com/jobs-divisions# ( last vis-
ited Apr. 16, 2012) (offering a description of retail jobs). 
 155. D.C. CODE § 2-1401.02(22) (2010). 
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tive masks.156 Courts should not find that a particular appear-
ance is a business necessity unless a person’s appearance 
makes it impossible to do the work, or, as in the above example, 
a different appearance actually impacts the safety of the indi-
vidual or others. These determinations should be made on the 
basis of reliable outside testimony. 
Appearance discrimination is an area where each individu-
al has already established personal biases. Courts must strive 
for greater objectivity. It is possible that the unconventional 
look of appearance discrimination plaintiffs may bias judges 
and juries against them.157 Therefore, it is particularly im-
portant for judges to demand objective and impartial evidence 
from employers seeking to benefit from a defense. 
Antidiscrimination statutes possess the power to drive so-
ciety in a new, more equal direction. Perhaps appearance dis-
crimination is so common because people have not learned a 
different method of operation. Allowing employers to escape 
penalty by alleging that attractive employees are necessary to 
their non-looks based business permits the perpetuation of atti-
tudes about appearance and prevents society from offering 
more equal opportunities.  
  CONCLUSION   
Discrimination on the basis of appearance is pervasive and 
common in American society. Only one state and a few cities 
offer direct protection to victims of appearance discrimination. 
Even these statutes offer possible escape routes for employers 
via employer defenses. These employer defenses must be po-
liced carefully to allow only businesses who genuinely sell looks 
to discriminate on the basis of appearance. Appearance dis-
crimination is equally as frequent, hurtful and inefficient as 
discrimination against any of the currently protected classes. It 
should be protected against with statutes similar to those 
which currently protect victims of race, sex, and age discrimi-
nation and employer defenses should be narrowly interpreted 
in order to begin a process of social change, leading to a society 
where employees are judged on the characteristics actually rel-
evant to employment. 
 
 156. See Kennedy v. District of Columbia, 654 A.2d 847, 857–58 (D.C. 
1994). 
 157. Research and anecdotal evidence combine to show that unconvention-
al or unattractive people are more likely to be found guilty, and receive small-
er awards as plaintiffs. PATZER, supra note 12, at 96. 
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State legislators must craft legislation that protects vic-
tims of appearance discrimination and clearly and narrowly de-
fines the limited circumstances in which employers may be al-
lowed to make appearance related distinctions. This targeted 
and narrow construction will protect victims of appearance dis-
crimination and put employers on notice that judgments on the 
basis of appearance are acceptable only in the rarest of circum-
stances. 
